WILL TURKEY MEET THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGE IN GEORGIA? Mevlut Katik 12/10/03
A EurasiaNet Commentary
Many Turkish critics are chastising Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for Turkey’s tentative outreach to the reformists who succeeded Shevardnadze on November 23. Turkey’s focus was elsewhere. As Shevardnadze was resigning, effectively acknowledging that he had overseen rigged parliamentary elections on November 2, Turkey was dealing with devastating suicide bombings in Istanbul and preparing for elections in Cyprus this month. Those elections are key to Turkey’s bid to join the European Union. But Turkey’s inveterate caution and single-minded focus on Europe may stunt relations with Georgia and the rest of the Caucasus.
While President Ahmet Necdet Sezer waited more than a week after Shevardnadze quit to telephone interim Georgian president Nino Burjanadze- and reportedly called Shevardnadze as well- Russia sent its foreign minister to Tbilisi during the crisis and strengthened ties with Ajaria after it. [For background see the EurasiaNet Insight archive].
But Turkish officials were hardly ignoring foreign affairs between the November 2 vote in Georgia and Shevardnadze’s November 23 departure. Erdogan was on a diplomatic mission in northern Cyprus on November 15 ahead of the upcoming elections there. Many observers see the legitimacy of those elections, scheduled for December 14, as pivotal to European Union (EU) members’ willingness to consider Turkey’s accession. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was in Sweden lobbying for EU membership the same day, when suicide bombers killed 15 people and wounded 300 at Istanbul synagogues. More deaths came five days later in an attack on an Istanbul bank.
Some argue that Turkey should not obsess over the European Union or linger in mourning while the chance to shape events in Georgia remains strong. Georgia, on this view, is the weak link in a potential axis from Azerbaijan to Turkey’s Mediterranean shores. Columnist Tuncay Ozkan, in the center-right daily Aksam, has argued this case in recent weeks. "Turkey has established very close ties with Georgia right after its independence," he wrote on December 1. "Ankara sent Georgia tons of wheat and opened a credit worth $50 million during its early days when Georgia did not even receive world attention… Turkey and Georgia have started jointly using an air base 30 kilometers out of Tbilisi." But Okzan concluded from the government’s conduct that "Turkey is now unable to even understand the developments [in the Caucasus], let alone to manipulate them." Other commentators, notably Sami Kohen of the daily Milliyet, have noted that worsening conditions in Iraq could fuse with instability in Georgia, threatening Turkey’s hopes for regional stability.
This pessimistic take ignores the possibility that Turkey’s almost silent stance during the ongoing Georgian crisis may have been to some degree deliberate. Turkish foreign policy, since Kemal Ataturk became its first secular president, has always followed a strict anti-interventionist path. Except with explosive situations like Iraq or disputed territories like Cyprus, Ankara generally avoids alienating any potential new leader who might seek warm ties. It did not weigh in on the elections in Azerbaijan, which also lack popular or international legitimacy. Even though Mikhail Saakashvili is overwhelmingly favored to win Georgia’s presidential elections on January 4, restive breakaway republics could undermine that election. Erdogan’s government might have held its cards in Georgia even without other international distractions, at least until that country’s leadership becomes clear.
Turkey cannot help but relate closely to Georgia. The countries have strong trade ties, and many expect the intensified trade and military covenants to strengthen them both. Turkish officers have pursued the idea of training Georgian soldiers, and both national armies have worked on a joint military program to protect pipelines. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Turkey is also known to have influence over Georgia’s breakaway provinces of Ajaria and Abkhazia, since many ethnic Caucasians live in Turkey and have relatives throughout the region. Turkish officials coordinated negotiations with Abkhaz and Ajarian officials at an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in Istanbul in 1999. In 2000, then-Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin reportedly tried to breach differences between Georgia and Ajaria. True to Turkish tradition, these talks sought to establish Turkey as a likable neighbor in every party’s view.
With an eye on European Union commissioners in Brussels, Turkey may simply be acting more guarded about similar initiatives. On December 5, Gul met with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts and pledged: "Turkey is ready to contribute [to resolving problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan] and undertake the role of catalyst."[For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. To some critics, this sort of talk gratifies European Union idealists at the expense of building strong regional ties with a receptive Georgia.
Mehdi Nuzhet Cetinbas, president of Istanbul’s Caucasus Foundation, called Turkey’s recent policy towards Georgia "inadequate" and "wrong" and said Ankara should have promoted democratic reforms long before the November crisis. "The new leadership in Georgia has rather nationalistic discourse and may initiate harsh measures against secessionist republics," Cetinbas told EurasiaNet. "Russia could have an edge in Georgia and in the Caucasus in general, as the leadership of Ajaria."
Georgian leadership seems receptive to warmer ties with Turkey. Saakashvili and Burjanadze have offered strong criticism of Russia and stressed their support for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. [For background see the EurasiaNet Insight archive]. The friendship, assuming Saakashvili takes office soon, appears to be Ankara’s to join. However, to create beneficial ties, Turkey’s leadership will have to express and embrace a broader strategic vision of its role in the Caucasus than they have managed so far.
Editor’s Note: Mevlut Katik is a London based journalist and analyst. He is a former BBC correspondent and also worked for The Economist group.
Posted December 10, 2003 © Eurasianet
http://www.eurasianet.org